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Abstract 
This chapter demonstrates the role of financial sector in achieving the demographic dividends 
for the Indian economy.  We developed an aggregative macro-econometric model 
supplemented by sectoral analysis of saving, investment and industrial productivity to explore 
possible connections. The model highlights the sensitivity of financial development to capital 
inflow with subsequent implications for the demographic dividends. We show that the 
benefits of the second demographic dividend in India are critically dependent on a 
significantly higher accumulation of assets that can be made possible via greater financial 
depth. In India, the sectoral composition of foreign capital has been biased towards service 
sectors, particularly banking and finance, albeit the inter-sectoral mobility of capital, however 
small and restrictive it might be, renders substantial impact on the productivity and 
employment in the unorganized sector of the country.  Notwithstanding such possibilities, the 
unorganized sector and more broadly the agricultural sector is still largely outside the formal 
credit network with the institutional credit flow declining over time. We propose that in order 
to reap the benefits of the demographic dividends, the financial sector policies, especially the 
banking sector policies, should be geared to bring the rural and informal industrial sector 
under the banking network much more aggressively. The mobilization of untapped savings 
and the expansion of lending institutions under strong legal support should crucially facilitate 
better realization of demographic dividends in India. 
    
Keywords: Demographic dividends, Financial development, Banking policy, Capital inflow, 
Informal sector 
JEL Classifications: J2, E2, E5, F4, G2, O4, O5, J3 
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1. Introduction 
     Over the last two decades countries like China, India, Brazil, South Africa and the 
Russian Federation experienced sweeping changes in their economies.  Albeit, the economic 
and financial reforms, which are credited for such changes occurred at different times for 
these countries the outcomes seem quite similar by the time these economies settled onto 
their respective growth trajectories.  It is no wonder then that the global forums recognize 
these economic successes as defining the new economic order, despite admission of critical 
internal disadvantages that continue to group these countries alongside other developing and 
transition economies.  The present chapter attempts to review the macroeconomic and 
financial conditions prevailing in India during this important transition period.  The main 
focus of this research, therefore, is to explore and observe the possible links and synergies 
between economic and financial developments functionally related to an important and yet 
relatively less emphasized factor, namely, the changing demographic pattern in India.   
It has been lately acknowledged that the relationships between demography, growth 
and distribution are quite different across countries mainly owing to asymmetric transition 
patterns in their population structure. Mindful of such possibilities and evidence, we make an 
attempt to relate demographic changes to the developments of the financial architecture in 
post-reform India and cover a void in this literature. It seems, broadly speaking, that the 
demographic asymmetry is also the source of higher growth rate in some of the south 
countries over a considerably long phase, arguably owing to the so-called first and second 
demographic dividends. In an increasingly integrated global system of commodity and factor 
flows, gains from such growth are rarely restricted to these countries alone. Notwithstanding, 
the persistent savings-investment gap (see, Basu 1997) continues to be a compelling source of 
transactions between the north and the south with significant inter-linkage effects spread out 
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globally.  
The plan of the chapter is as follows. In section 1.1, we offer the important 
macroeconomic characterizations for India, where the population growth, the savings 
patterns, the investment patterns, trade patterns and capital inflows, all as part of the GDP are 
discussed in order to motivate the macro-econometric exercise that we engage with in section 
2.  A review of the literature reveals that studies in this area are generally scant, and 
especially so for India.1 In this regard, the chapter aims to do justice to the two main 
objectives, namely, identification of the financial institutions that interact with demography, 
and two, the exploration of the relationship between specific macroeconomic variables such 
as cross-border capital flows and the interest rate, to the changing demographic pattern. In the 
process, we investigate if the overwhelming size of the unorganized sector in India can have 
interesting links to potential demographic dividends. In section 3 we show that capital 
flowing into the organized sector creates jobs in the unorganized sector, via outsourcing and 
technology transmission epitomizing internationalization of production (Hanson, 2001). Note 
that, the inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the developing countries over the last 
few decades has also been one of the most vibrant instruments of global standardization, 
especially through sectoral spillovers. However, FDI has led to both production integration as 
well as fragmentation. Of these, production fragmentation allows firms to utilize cheaper 
factors, such as low-cost labor inputs, along the value-added chain leading to gains from 
specialization (Deardorff, 2005; and for outsourcing, see Helpman, 2006). Using recent 
survey data, we establish in section 3 that foreign investments in the organized sector may 
                                                 
1
 However, Dyson (2008) offers a comprehensive survey on the general issues of demography and development 
process in India. See also Visaria (2009), Devika (2008), Thapa et al. (2012), James and Subramanian (2003), 
Ladusingh and Narayana (2011) and in a comparative assessment across Asia, Asian Development Bank (2011). 
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lead to outsourcing to unorganized sectors. Previous studies on interactions between 
organized and unorganized sectors following globalization (see, Harriss 1990, Guha-
Khasnobis and Kanbur 2006, Marjit 2003 and in particular, Siggel, 2010, for a review) do not 
make an attempt to relate that to the growing population and demographic dividends facing 
the country in question.  In terms of demographic dividends high degree of informality in a 
country is not expected to raise productivity and economic benefits out of a large working 
age population.  To add to the woes, the rural and underdeveloped India still hosts 68% of all 
population, suggesting that the demographic transition would only have considerable 
economic merit, if the economic and financial conditions in rural areas improve significantly. 
In section 3 we further discuss that unless the capital constraints in the rural areas are 
overcome with significant alacrity, the entire discussion on the demographic dividends shall 
be futile. These also constitute our predominant policy suggestions provided in section 4.  
 
1.1 The Indian Perspective 
Let us elaborate briefly on what the first and second demographic dividends imply for 
India. The much discussed rise in India's demographic dividend means that the country’s 
dependency ratio, as measured by the share of the young and the elderly as a fraction of the 
population, will come down more sharply in the coming decades. Increase in the share of 
working age population implies that more workers in the productive age groups will add to 
the total output, generate more savings, accrue more capital per worker, and all of these 
would lead to higher economic growth. It is further expected that since demographic change 
is associated with decline in fertility, the transition shall be accompanied by greater female 
participation in the labor force. According to the India Population Census (2011) figures, the 
total population in India is 1.21 billion, which is expected to rise up to 1.40 billion by 2026 
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mainly owing to an increase in life expectancy at birth for males and females from 65.8 and 
68.1 years, respectively.  These figures reported between 2006 and 2010 shall rise up to 69.8 
and 72.3 years respectively during 2021–2025.  Second, a decline in the total fertility rate 
(TFR) from 2.6 to 2.0 is the main initiator of demographic dividends, such that the fall in 
TFR (with older generations having shorter life expectancies), the dependency ratio declines 
dramatically. The overall effect is considered as the source of demographic dividend for 
India.  The implications of the demographic transition on age structure are further evident for 
the population below 20 years, for which the share in total population went down from 51% 
in 1970 to 41% in 2010 and may further decline to 22% in 2050.  During the same period, the 
share of the total population under the age of 60 marginally increased from 5.5% to 8%. This 
will rise and is expected to reach 22% in 2050. The large decline in the share of the 
population under 19 years of age has been associated with a substantial rise in the proportion 
of the working-age population (19–59 years) from 43% to 51% between 1970 and 2010 and 
is forecasted at a maximum of 56% by 2045.  
Within India, not surprisingly, the distribution of population growth has been 
asymmetric. The rural population in India is still around 68% of the total population (Census 
of India, 2011), whereas, the urban population pattern is somewhat similar to comparable 
countries. Also not unexpectedly, the windows of opportunities are proportionately more 
concentrated in the urban areas, such that, the dwindling prospects in agriculture shall 
perpetuate the rural-urban migration as characterizing the path of development for the last 
several decades. The interface between the financial systems as a whole, access to more 
productive economic activities and the population distribution therefore needs a re-
evaluation.      
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Viewed over a three-decade horizon, the GDP growth rate in India (Fig. 1.1) hovered 
between 9% way back in 1977 to negative and fairly low growth rates for most parts of the 
decade of the 1980s. In the post-reform (1991) period, while the country grew at 6% rate in 
most years, by the year 2000 it crossed the 8% mark and despite 4% growth rates in the 
following three years it went up to 8% once again in 2004. Subsequently it grew at 9% and 
10% rates until 2009 when the onset of global recession pushed it down to 4% again.  
Nevertheless, and somewhat contrary to the global trend, India registered more than 10% 
growth even for 2011, beyond which however, the rate of growth caved in with revised 
estimates at 5.2% in 2013.                 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Real GDP Growth Rate for India: 1975-2012                              
Real GDP Growth Rate for India
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 Since the focus of the present chapter is about the demographic transition in India 
Figure 1.2 shows that the dependency ratio (defined as, 

  100100
PopulationTotal
forcelabor ) has 
been going down steadily over time – a characteristic associated with the rising share of 15-
59 year old population (see Albrieu and Fanelli, 2012 for cross country comparison and 
analysis).  Since the base population is already high for countries like China and India, it is 
expected that the demographic dividends might be more for these countries provided 
adequate opportunities through human capital growth and access to economic and financial 
activities present themselves.  Importantly, the dependency ratio for India has come down to 
50 in the year 2012.           
 
Figure 1.2. Dependency Ratio for India: 1975-2012   
Dependency Ratio for India: 1975-2012
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Source: WDI, World Bank 
 
The population growth rate stuck between 2.5 and 2% until 1990s went below 2% for 
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the first time in 1993. The downward trend has continued since then with the growth rate at 
1.5% in 2012.  The population growth rate is still sufficiently high (despite significant 
urbanization and improvement in literacy rates) to expect a high rate of entry into the 
workforce. If the trend continues even for the medium run, one should expect co-existence of 
young and ageing population, the latter supported via transfers.          
 Figure 1.3 The Population growth rate in India: 1975-2011   
Population Growth Rates
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       Source: WDI, World Bank 
 
  
 The relevance of the economic and financial institutions is unmistakable in such an 
environment. It is expected that the bank-based financial system in India shall bestow greater 
access to credit and allied facilities for partaking the economic and financial benefits of a 
growing labor force.  Figure 1.4 suggests that the domestic credit flow in India has risen from 
a meager 25% in 1975 to almost 75% in 2012, which given the GDP of India is considerably 
large.  It should also be noted that the outreach of the financial sector and the instruments of 
investments available thereof are in much better shape at least as far as the stock market 
activities of India (figure 1.5) are concerned.  India seems to be trading larger amounts in 
stocks and after a peak in the year 2000 (same as China) the value is at a significantly high 
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level (60% of GDP).  These are suggestive of financial depth and vibrancy for a country in 
need of many other interventionist policies to rise to the level of the developed world. In fact, 
in recent times the role of financial system in the growth process has experienced a renewed 
interest (see, Levine, 1997, 1999, 2004; Levine, Loyaza, and Beck, 2000; Obstfeld, 1994; and 
for India see, Das and Guha-Khasnabis, 2005).    
     Figure 1.4  Domestic Bank Credit as % of GDP  
Domestic Credit Provided by Banks (% of GDP)
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Figure 1.5 Total Value of Stocks Traded in India 
Total Value of Stocks Traded (% of GDP)
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   Source: WDI, World Bank 
 
 Interestingly, during the same period India leapfrogged to the world of service 
sector related activities.  In fact, India’s share of service sector in its GDP has gone up to 
more than 50% (figure 1.7) and in terms of the trade in services, India (at 8% of GDP by 
2004, figure 1.6) is also doing better compared to some of the other countries in this group.                                      
  Figure 1.6.  Trade in Services as % of GDP 
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Note further, that the inflow of northern capital seeking higher per unit return on the 
dollar invested is one of the major resource base for the sprawling service sector. The growth 
of financial intermediaries and the development of a well functioning financial market are 
only natural derivatives of these complex interactions.   
 
 
Figure 1.7 India’s Share of Service Sector in GDP 
Share of Services in GDP (Current US$)
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      Source: Reserve Bank of India, Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy 
 
 
Section 2 uses the cross-country financial flow as an important instrument to trace the 
demography-to-growth link.  It seems that the sectoral composition of foreign capital inflow 
has the largest share (19%) coming to the service sector and more specifically to the banking 
and finance sector (Table 1.1).  This is followed by construction (11%) and 
telecommunication (7%). The country-wise share of aggregate foreign capital inflow to India 
is as follows: Mauritius (38%), Singapore (11%), UK (9%), Japan (7%) and USA (6%).  
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Table 1.1 Sectoral Composition of Foreign Capital Inflow to India Rs. Cr. (US$ Million) 
Sr. 
No. 
Sector  2011-12  
  
2012-13  
 
2013-14  
(Apr to 
June, ’13) 
Cumulative 
Inflows  
(April 2000- 
June 2013)  
% to 
total  
1.  Services Sector **  24,656 
(5,216) 
26,306 
(4,833) 
5,319 
(945) 
177,595 
(38,180) 
19 % 
2.  Construction: Township, 
Housing, Built-up 
Infrastructure  
15,236 
(3,141) 
7,248 
(1,332) 
946 
(167) 
101,995 
(22,248) 
11 % 
3.  Telecommunications (radio 
paging, cellular mobile, basic 
telephone services)  
9,012 
(1,997) 
1,654 
(304) 
54 
(10) 
58,786 
(12,866) 
7 % 
4.  Computer Software & 
Hardware  
3,804 
(796) 
2,656 
(486) 
984 
(171) 
53,758 
(11,738) 
6 % 
5.  Drugs & Pharmaceuticals  14,605 
(3,232) 
6,011 
(1,123) 
5,442 
(1,000) 
54,322 
(11,318) 
6 % 
6.  Chemicals (other than 
Fertilizers)  
18,422 
(4,041) 
1,596 
(292) 
623 
(112) 
41,118 
(8,993) 
5 % 
7.  Automobile Industry 4,347 
(923) 
8,384 
(1,537) 
2,845 
(515) 
42,015 
(8,810) 
4 % 
8.  Power  7,678 
(1,652) 
2,923 
(536) 
669 
(120) 
36,805 
(7,954) 
4 % 
9.  Metallurgical Industries  8,348 
(1,786) 
7,878 
(1,466) 
634 
(114) 
35,448 
(7,621) 
4 % 
10  Hotel & Tourism  4,754 
(993) 
17,777 
(3,259) 
559 
(101) 
33,819 
(6,732) 
3 % 
Note: (i)** Services sector includes Financial, Banking, Insurance, Non-Financial / Business, Outsourcing,    
            R&D, Courier, Tech. Testing and Analysis  
          (ii) FDI sectoral data has been revalidated / reconciled in line with the RBI, which reflects  minor   
          changes in  FDI figures (increase/decrease) as compared to the earlier published  sectoral data. 
 
In addition to the level and composition of capital inflow presented in Table 1.1, we 
highlight that India is the largest recipient of migrant remittances.  It has been argued before 
(Kar and Guha-Khasnobis, 2006) that higher levels of skill formation juxtaposed with lack of 
opportunities in the industrial and related sectors in the country leads to significant 
emigration of skilled and semi-skilled workers from India.  A sizable section of these 
emigrants find jobs in the Middle-East and generates the main source of inward remittances 
for India presently reported at US$ 65 bn. (International Financial Statistics, IMF, 2012).  It 
is an integral part of the financial system that capital inflow can reduce the cost of capital and 
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thereby increase growth rate in the real sector [see for example, Giannetti et al. (2002), 
Hartman, Maddalani and Mangalleni (2003) and Bagella, Becchetti and Hasan (2004) on the 
growth enhancing effect on the GDP]. We accommodate the varying trajectories of labor and 
capital as discussed above, in the following empirical structure relating economic growth, 
demographic changes and the financial depth of India.    
 
 
2. Demography and Growth: A Macro-econometric Model  
        2.1    The Framework  
This section develops a macro-econometric model for India to explain the 
interactions between demographic changes, development of financial system and 
international capital inflow. In the tradition of the macro-econometric modeling, following 
the influential work of Sims (1980), we build up the model in a time series vector 
autoregression (VAR) framework.2 The variables of interest in this model are dependency 
ratio, financial depth, real interest rate prevailing in India and international capital flow to 
India. The variables are defined as: 
DR = Dependency ratio = 100-[Population ages 15-64 (% of total)] (vide IMF 2006) 
FD = Financial depth = [Bank deposits + Stock Market capitalization] / Previous year’s GDP 
r = Interest rate = Bank interest rate on lending adjusted for inflation, 
FLOW = Capital inflow = [Foreign Direct Investment + Foreign Institutional Investment +  
                                           NRI Investment] / GDP 
Data for dependency ratio is available from the World Bank (2012). Financial depth has been 
variously defined (see Levine, 2004) and we have used an alternative definition of financial 
depth, in conformity with the financial system in India. It is defined as the bank deposits or 
                                                 
2
 Later works in this area are Kehoe (2006), Lutkepohl and Kratzig (2004), Stock and Watson (2001).  
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private credit with or without market capitalization as proportion of previous year’s GDP. 
However, the financial system outside the organized segment is not covered by this definition 
and neither is there any systematic financial data for units belonging to the unorganized 
sector. For interest rate, on the other hand, we consider the government securities rate, which 
is a reasonable indicator of the short-run interest rate in the economy.  The data runs from 
1980-81 to 2011-12, a total of 32 annual data points per series.  The unavailability of some of 
the crucial indicators, such as insurance penetration for longer time horizons (or quarterly 
data for shorter horizons) restricts our analysis to some extent.  Moreover, data for the 
population changes, age profile, and work force/hours of work etc. are not available at all.    
        
2.2   Descriptive Analysis 
Figures 2.1 through 2.3 provide the yearly movements of the variables used in the 
econometric analysis.  It is evident from Fig. 2.1 that the financial depth (as defined) has 
increased substantially over the years. There is a level change in financial depth in the early 
1990s, then another in 2003 with a higher trend till 2007-08.  Since 2007-08, however, the 
financial depth shows a declining trend mainly owing to the fall in market capitalization in 
the aftermath of global crisis when the value of shares declined, globally. However, when we 
use an alternative measure of financial depth, namely, bank deposit to last year’s GDP, it 
does not show a declining trend.  Needless to mention, the improvement in financial depth 
came about because of the large-scale reforms in the financial sector initiated since 1991. The 
improvement in the financial depth is subsequently expected to reduce the extent of financial 
repression in the economy.  This is also reflected in the observed fall in real interest rate (Fig. 
2.2).   
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Fig. 2.2. Real interest rate
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Fig 2.3: Share of FDI, FII and NRI Deposits in GDP
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The third variable, namely, the inflow of international capital to India has three major 
components.  Of these, the NRI deposits were allowed only since 1991.  Fig. 2.3 provides the 
movements of the three components as proportion of GDP over the years.  Fig. 2.1 shows 
increasing trends for the Foreign Institutional Investments (FII), which is more volatile in 
nature owing to high sensitivity to short-run capital gains.3  In fact, the monthly movements 
of the FII reveal sharper volatility. FDI had a constant flow until 2004, following which it 
showed a rising trend that started declining since 2008.  
Table 2.1a provides the descriptive statistics for the full sample period, while Table 
2.1b provides the same for the post-reform period.  The mean values for dependency ratio or 
interest rate are not different across the full sample period and the post-reform sub-periods. 
However, the mean values of financial depth and capital inflow are higher for the post-reform 
period.  
                                                 
3
 Although, there is lack of evidence, but the operators in this market hint that FII periodically flows in, but as 
the time to pay dividends to the shareholders approaches, they readily flow out of the country. 
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Table 2.1a Descriptive Statistics (Full Sample) 
Variable Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis 
DR 66.58 6.92 -0.31479 1.74 
FD 0.84 0.463 0.2143 0.7772 
r 6.306 2.16 -0.8886 3.823 
FLOW 0.02315 0.0231 0.9658 3.001 
 
 
Table 2.1b Descriptive Statistics (Post Reform Period) 
Variable Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis 
DR 62.36 5.1568   -0.00042 1.7119 
FD 1.08 0.4103 0.65118   1.8766 
R 6.043 2.3836 -0.82645 3.5428 
FLOW 0.0357 0.02076 0.7957 2.5756 
 
 We begin by presenting a robust OLS estimate for two crucial relations.  First, we 
consider the relationship between aggregate growth rate and dependency ratio.  This is 
followed by the relationship between aggregate growth rate and financial development. Table 
2.2 reports the preliminary regression results between growth rate of GDP (at factor cost and 
at constant 2004-05 prices) and the other two variables for the period 1980-81 to 2011-12. 
Since all three variables are found to be stationary, the statistical relations are meaningful in 
the sense of time series regression.4 We report the regression results both for the current value 
and lagged values of the two regressors. Growth rate has a significant relation both with 
dependency ratio (negative) and financial development (positive). The relations are 
statistically significant (at 1% level) and of the same sign both for the current and the lagged 
values of the respective variables. However, we did not find any significant relation between 
growth rate and interest rate.  The results suggest that a meaningful econometric relation 
including causal relations between dependency ratio, financial depth, interest rate and capital 
                                                 
4 Stationarity of dependency ratio is discussed later. ADF test for growth rate of GDP is found to reject the null 
hypothesis of stationarity.  
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inflow will have direct bearings on the growth rate of the economy.  
 
Table 2.2.    Regression of growth rate on Dependency Ratio and Financial 
Development (current and one year lag) 
 
   
 
 
             
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: We did not report the estimate of constant. 
 
2.3   Stationary Properties of the Data Series 
Next we check for the stationary properties of the data. Table 2.3 provides the 
relevant test results. Graphical plot of the data series for the four variables shows that except 
for dependency ratio (Fig. 1.2) other series report one or more structural breaks.  Hence, we 
employed the Bai-Perron Test (Bai and Perron, 2003), which is the appropriate test when the 
number of breaks and the exact time of occurrence are both unknown.5 Except for the 
dependency ratio, the null hypothesis of structural breaks is not rejected for the other three 
variables.6 Owing to the presence of multiple structural breaks in the series the Dickey-Fuller 
or the Augmented-Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Tests are not appropriate for testing for unit root or 
non-stationarity in general. Instead, the BLS Test (Banerjee, Lumsdaine and Stock, 1992) is 
the appropriate test statistic, which provides inference on non-stationarity of the time series 
data independent of the presence of break points. Further, among the three tests of BLS 
variety we reported the sequential F-Test. Table 2.3 provides results of unit root tests for both 
                                                 
5
 For sake of brevity we did not report Bai-Perron Test results here, which are available on request. 
6
 We deployed Bai-Perron Test for 3 to 4 break points.  
Dependency Ratio 
(A) 
Financial Development 
(B) 
Coeff 
(t-value) 
DR 
(1) 
DR (-1) 
(2) 
FD 
(3) 
FD (-1) 
(4) 
-0.14** 
(-3.12) 
-0.16** 
(-3.38) 
2.59** 
(4.53) 
2.56** 
(3.31) 
R2 0.23 0.27 0.30 0.28 
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ADF and BLS test statistics. The table points out that the null hypothesis of unit root is 
rejected by both BLS and ADF in all the cases, albeit the later test does not reject the null 
hypothesis for financial depth. Overall, given the superiority of BLS test we rejected the 
presence of non-stationarity in the series. 
Table 2.3 Stationary Properties of the Variables 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: * and **stand respectively for significance at 1% and 5% levels. 
 
2.4    Econometric Specification and Estimation Results 
The macro-econometric model is specified in terms of the four variables as follows: 
ttptpttot xyAyAyAAAy     .....2211                         (2.1) 
where, ')      ( ttttt FLOWrFDDRy  , A = matrix of contemporaneous coefficients, 0A = vector 
of constants of order 4x1, iA = matrix of coefficients of the lagged variables, i=1,…,p, each of 
order 4x4,   = vector of coefficients for the exogenous variables, and tx = vector of 
exogenous variables. t is the vector of disturbances for the set of structural equations and 
BE tt )( ' , variance-covariance matrix of the structural shocks. 
     Variable Augmented Dickey-
Fuller Test 
Banerjee-Lumsdaine-
Stock Sequential F-test 
DR -8.939* 
 
5924122.83* 
 
FD -3.115  
 
74.00* 
 
R -3.948** 
 
6.52* 
 
FLOW -5.653* 
 
27.83* 
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where, j s i=1….,p, are reduced form parameter vector/ matrices and 
~  is the vector of 
reduced form parameter vector / matrices of exogenous variables. The relationship between 
reduced form disturbances and the corresponding variance-covariance matrix are given by 
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The VAR is estimated in reduced form and then structural form parameters are obtained via 
identification conditions. The estimated reduced form VAR is reported below in Table 2.4. A 
two lag structure was found to be appropriate. We checked with the roots of the estimated 
VAR and found that all the eigenvalues lie inside the unit circle. This confirms the stability of 
the estimated VAR model. We also included time as an exogenous variable. Dependency 
ratio has the expected negative time trend. The time trend in the equations for interest rate 
and capital inflow are also negative with high absolute value for the coefficient of interest 
rate. There is, however, a dilemma in this context. Financial development reduces the interest 
rate, which in turn is expected to raise domestic investment. Since, international capital 
inflow is considered to supplement inadequate domestic investment a reduction in interest 
rate reduces capital inflow and creates a tension.  
In addition, we test for Granger causality (Table 2.5). The null hypothesis is that the 
estimated coefficients of lagged values of the other endogenous variables are jointly zero. 
The relevant test statistic is Wald Statistics. Except for the cases of capital inflow to 
dependency ratio, and financial depth to interest rate, the null hypothesis of no (Granger) 
causality is rejected at 5% level (at 1% level for others). The result that capital inflow does 
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not Granger cause dependency ratio appeals to conventional wisdom.  But, the result that 
financial development does not Granger cause interest rate is interesting in the context of 
this paper. This means that there are even stronger factors that affect the interest rate 
compared to the level of financial development as measured by financial depth in our model.  
Table 2.4  VAR Estimation Results 
Variable 
Lag 
DR FD r FLOW 
DR(-1) 1.916** -0.623 -13.101** -0.081** 
DR(-2) -0.940** 0.538 12.589** 0.075** 
FD(-1) 0.056** 0.528* 0.75 0.027* 
FD(-2) 0.008 0.674** 1.765 0.055** 
r(-1) 0.004** -0.032* 0.074 -0.002* 
r(-2) 0.005** 0.021 0.167 0.001 
FLOW(-1) -0.106 -10.194** -47.949 -0.699** 
FLOW(-2) 0.261 -9.511** 24.202 -0.826** 
Time -0.019** -0.044 -0.81* -0.004* 
RMSE 0.0131 0.1514 1.693 0.01 
             Note: (1)* implies significant at 5% ** at 1%. 
                  (2) Log likelihood = 171.72, SBIC = -6.913, Det (Sigma_ML) = 1.25e-10, N = 30. 
 
Finally, we estimate the structural model to find the nature of contemporaneous 
relations among the endogenous variables. For this, we imposed short-run restrictions for 
identification. Defining matrix B as structural innovations, one can justifiably assume zero 
covariance between the four innovations; the principal diagonal of matrix A is unity for 
normalization; the rest of the constraints are exclusion conditions on the coefficients of A and 
are estimated. After several trial and errors we found the appropriate structural form model as 
described by the estimated A matrix and B matrix given below. *, ** denote statistical 
significance at 5% and 1%, respectively. 
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                      Table 2.5. Granger Causality (Wald Test) 
Equation Excluded 2 Test statistic df 
DR 
FD 7.842* 2 
r 18.79** 2 
FLOW 1.534 2 
All 19.36** 6 
FD 
DR 6.385* 2 
r 6.436* 2 
FLOW 18.19** 2 
All 24.41** 6 
r 
DR 7.907* 2 
FD 0.5968 2 
FLOW 3.96* 2 
All 20.78** 6 
FLOW 
DR 10.768** 2 
FD 18.14** 2 
r 8.348* 2 
All 34.434**  
    Note: * implies significant at 5% and ** significant at 1% 
 
Identification matrix 











10019736.0
019994.30
0010
000669.06445.01
*
*
****
A  
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








**
**
**
**
00808.0000
03972.100
00112713.00
0001362.0
B  
 Our structural VAR model is over-identified with two more restrictions than are 
needed for identification. This version of the model is finally found to be the best in terms of 
several measures of goodness of fit. The LR test of over identifying restriction is not rejected 
at 5% (or even at 10%) level with a 2 value of 3.615 with df 2 and the probability, 0.164.  
It follows that the Dependency ratio is positively related to interest rate and financial 
depth. Interest rate is negatively related to financial depth – a confirmation of the fact that 
financial development and interest rate move in opposite direction, contemporaneously. On 
the other hand, the Dependency ratio and capital inflow move together in contemporaneous 
time.  
These allow us to plot the Structural Impulse Response Functions (SIRF) and 
Structural Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (SFEVD) for a horizon of 10 years in Figs. 
2.4 and 2.5 respectively. Fig. 2.4 shows that a shock to dependency ratio marginally reduces 
interest rate, which then rises but eventually converges to the earlier level. On the other hand, 
the impact of a structural shock to financial depth has greater impact in reducing interest rate 
in the current period and the effect takes around five years to die down. Shock to capital 
inflow has a negative impact on interest rate after two years, rises beyond it and eventually 
converges to the initial equilibrium level from fifth year onwards. SIRFs in other cases report 
no impact. The panel for error variance decomposition together with SIRF and coefficients of 
the A matrix reveal that FD is exogenous in contemporaneous time. In other words, financial 
depth is not affected by the other contemporaneous variables. This is in conformity with its 
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role as a policy variable, which is shaped by policy interventions from the government and 
other regulatory agencies, such as Reserve Bank of India. Our results largely subscribe to the 
findings in Monnet and Quintin (2007), which suggest that financial system architecture of 
any country at any point of time is the outcome of policy interventions in historical episodes.  
In a way, our results differ from Thakor and Song (2010) that built up the case for co-
movement of different segments of the financial system, with banks preceding the stock 
market because of its efficiency in mitigating project risks in the early phase of growth.   
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The estimated econometric model establishes the roles of dependency ratio, financial 
development and the interest rate channel on capital inflow. However, the rate of capital 
inflow is not very encouraging compared to other emerging market economies, particularly 
China and other East Asian countries, which are already going through the second phase of 
demographic transition. The capital inflow to GDP ratio is 3.57% in the post reform period 
with a very high degree of volatility. The source of volatility comes from a portfolio 
investment component, which we have discussed as a significant source. Consequently, a 
slight underperformance of the economy or rumors about policy shifts quickly manifests into 
herd behavior among investors. Notwithstanding, these observations on the aggregate macro-
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econometric model fail to reveal adequate levels of intricate information on how the economy 
adjusts to demographic transitions.  
 In the case of growth and development driven by demography, as we have suggested 
in the introduction, the rate of investment has to increase to an unprecedented level, 
particularly when a country enters or is due to enter the second phase of demographic 
window.  This shall enhance the rate of capital formation to permanently raise the labor 
productivity (Albrieu and Fanelli, 2012, Mason and Lee, 2006, 2011 in general and 
Ladusingh and Narayana, 2011 for India, in particular). The experiences with recent 
development saga in East Asia hint that a rate of investment exceeding 40% is warranted so 
that India may reap the benefits of the second demographic dividend. However, in contrast to 
the well-known two-gap model, it seems that there may be stark inadequacy of international 
capital flows. This prompts us to look into the domestic savings and investment as the more 
feasible alternatives. In addition, the abundant stock of domestic investment sets a congenial 
atmosphere for international capital to flow in. We have used two measures of financial 
depth, namely, (i) ratio of bank deposits to previous period’s GDP, and (ii) ratio of bank 
deposits plus market capitalization to previous period’s GDP. These variables are plotted in 
Fig. 2.6 over 1980-81 to 2011-12, which shows that the financial depth is positively related to 
both the rate of saving as well as, investment.  The positive relation is more consistent when 
financial depth is measured in terms of bank deposits only.  Since the year 1999-00, all the 
three variables show rising trends against time. When financial depth is measured by 
including market capitalization, its relationship with saving or investment fluctuate more than 
the other measure.  After 2003-04, the financial depth inclusive of market capitalization 
follows a marked departure from earlier trend for a few years until the onset of global 
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financial crisis. During this period, the trend path of saving or investment does not show any 
change.  
Fig.2.6 The Rates of Domestic Saving, Investment and 
Financial Depth
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 Table 2.6 engages in a detailed analysis of how the scope and returns from investment 
have responded over the period under consideration. Table 2.6 reports that the interest rates 
including 10 year yield to maturity of government securities show declining trends.  In India, 
the return on capital market instruments is measured by two indices – BSE-SENSEX and 
BSE-100 Index. The first one is the most widely used though its coverage is small (only a 30-
scrip index).  Hence, returns on an index with larger coverage (100 scrip index) are also 
reported.  Index values realized show high annual returns until 2007-08.  However, this is due 
to more secondary market rather than the primary market, transactions, which is a 
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manifestation of speculative activities. After 2007-08, when the capital markets crashed 
globally, the index return in India too declined by 40% within a year. 
  
Table 2.6: Overall Financial Indicators 
Indicator 1991-92 1994-95 1999-2000 2006-07 2011-12 
Return on govt. securities (% pa) 11.46 12.58 10.17 7.64 8.45 
Bank deposit rate (% pa) 9.5 10 9.25 8 8.88 
Bank lending rate (% pa) 16 15 13 10.75 10.75 
Return on BSE-SENSEX (% pa) 81.22 33.26 40.78 45.89 -6.40 
Return on BSE-100 Index (% pa) 68.54 33.74 56.99 40.16 -7.52 
Market capitalization – All India (Rs. Billion) 908.36 4354.81 9128.42 35450.4 62095.35 
Total no. of new share issues  366 1591 69 114 49 
Total no. of new debenture issues 145 121 10 3 0 
Total value of new share issues (Rs. Billion) 19.16 118.77 27.53 297.56 81.56 
Total value of new debenture issues (Rs. Billion) 42.75 88.71 24.01 8.47 0.00 
            Source: Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy, Reserve Bank of India (various years), 
                           And Prowess, CMIE. 
          Note: (i) Return on Govt. securities is measured by yield to maturity of 10 year govt. securities. 
      (ii) Return on BSE-SENSEX and BSE-100 indices are calculated on the basis of annual average    
        index value over months (Apr.-Mar.). 
 
Recent growth in India, especially during the reform period has come about due to a 
very high growth in the service sector of which financial services comprising of the banking, 
and insurance command larger contributions. The growth in value added has been very high, 
although growth in employment has been rather low.  The countries that are old in the path of 
demographic transition, such as the US, Germany, the UK, Japan and the relatively younger 
countries (but still older than India in the path of demographic dividend), such as China and 
other East Asian economies, all have much lower share in services. For India, the growth of 
service sector entails growth of self-employment and growth of employment in the 
construction sector with low level of earnings.  Note that, these would automatically suggest 
that India has not been the biggest beneficiary of the demographic dividend, typically because 
activities such as low quality self-employment practices and the involvement in construction 
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and allied activities account for low level of productivity leading to poor levels of saving and 
capital accumulation.  In other words, the benefits of the second demographic dividend are 
unlikely, without major policy interventions from the government. The dependence on 
foreign capital for fostering investments and growth implies increased exposure to 
speculative attacks and risk of economic turmoil that characterized the East Asian crisis.     
Historically speaking, following the ‘take-off’ the main source of growth in India has 
come from growth of total factor productivity.  Higher growth has come more from physical 
capital per worker, more human capital per worker and higher total factor productivity. 
Although the growth of employment in the industries (registered sector) in India is same as 
that in other Asian countries, growth in value added has been much less.  Productivity of 
Indian industry has been generally low.  Further, inadequate investment in infrastructure has 
led to deceleration of the industries dependent on the infrastructure.  Important infrastructure 
related inputs to industry, including power have been dismal (40% of all households in India 
are still without regularized power supply) and neither the private sector nor large public 
investments in the power sector came up to meet this deficiency.  It has been argued that the 
poor infrastructure facilities hinder growth of private entrepreneurship and accounts for poor 
performance of the economy in general. In this connection, the depth of the unorganized 
sector should be considered as a disadvantage rather than advantage if India must engage its 
younger labor force to more productive activities.  We suggest that the demographic dividend 
with large number of workers entering the work force is in fact contributing to the growth, 
although in the behest of the unorganized sector.  Since the formal industrial sector does not 
employ significantly and the service sector, where all growth is accumulated in recent times, 
jointly characterize India as the land of jobless growth, it is not expected that the 
demographic dividends shall accrue in full. The unorganized sector might be lending an 
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invisible support (the government reports clearly acknowledges it without quantifying the 
formal-informal link, unlike here) to this process, albeit incapable of achieving the 
demographic dividend.   
             
3.       Capital Inflow and the Formal-Informal Production Linkages  
From the year 2000 inflow of FDI has been promoted hugely in India, including 
permission for 100% share with automatic approval in most sectors like, textiles, paper, 
chemicals, drugs and pharmaceuticals, rubber and plastic, non-metallic mineral products, 
metal products, machinery and equipment and automobiles. Notably, all these products have 
parallel production in the unorganized sector creating scope for outsourcing. We measure 
effects of organized wages, technology and FDI flowing into the formal sector, on the gross 
value added (GVA) of the unorganized firms.  We find that FDI coming into the organized 
sector results in a higher GVA of the unorganized sector. We also try to find a transmission 
mechanism through which FDI affects informal sector.  Section 3.1 discusses the data and 
variables, section 3.2 the econometric specification and section 3.3 the results. Section 3.4 
offers an overview for this section.  Table 3.1 depicts the degree and range of activities in the 
unorganized sector as per Census of India (2011). 
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Table 3.1. Table Showing Labor Input in the Unorganized Sector 
 
Source: Report of the Committee on Unorganized Statistics, MOSPI, 2012 
  
3.1 Data Sources 
Annual data (2000-01 and 2005-06) for the organized sector is obtained from Annual 
Survey of Industries (ASI) and that of the unorganized sector (2000-01 and 2005-06) from 
National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO)7.  Annual data (1998, 1999, 2003 and 2004) 
for Foreign Direct Investment is taken from the Department of Industrial Policy and 
Promotion, Government of India. Our main objectives are to find whether formal firms in 
India outsource to the unorganized sector and to subsequently test if technology in the 
unorganized sector interacts with FDI in the organized sector to raise GVA of the 
unorganized firms.  
 
 
                                                 
7 The choice of years for industry data is restricted by availability of recent data for unorganized sector 
industries.  NSSO uses the term Fixed Assets to imply Fixed Capital stock as in ASI.   
  
 
 
32 
Proposition 1: With low growth of employment in the formal industrial sector and in the 
service sector, the larger employment growth is confined to the informal 
sector leading to partial benefits from the expected demographic dividend.    
Proof: We derive the relations below.   
 
The Choice of Variables 
We consider gross value added (GVAi), the fixed assets (FAi), wages (wagei) and the 
technology (Techi), i defining the organized sector (OR) and the unorganized (UN) sector.  
These variables are characterized by standard definitions. We also consider the volume of 
FDI coming into the organized manufacturing industries as explanatory variables. 
Corresponding to the year 2000-01, we consider the volume of FDI inflow in the years 1998, 
1999 and corresponding to the year 2005-06, we consider the volume of FDI inflow in the 
years 2003 and 2004. This is because FDI is less likely to have effect on the industry 
parameters instantly. FDI has three components, viz., equity capital, reinvested earnings, and 
intra company loans.8  FDI flowing into the industries one year ago (FDI 
-1) and two years 
ago (FDI 
-2) is studied.  Following Tybout (1997) and Bhaumik et. al. (2006), we used the 
capital-labor ratio as a proxy for technology. 
 
3.2 Econometric Specification and Results 
We use a generalized least square (GLS) estimation technique to account for 
heteroscadasticity in the data and autocorrelation in the data for FDI. We have converted all 
the nominal variables of 2000-01 to real variables by deflating them with the wholesale price 
                                                 
8 Earlier data on FDI in India included only cash acquisition of equity and preference capital; later on it follows 
standard IMF definition (GoI, 2002). 
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index of 2000-01 and the variables of 2005-06 by deflating them with the wholesale price 
index of 2005-06.9 We also control for industry specific AR(1) in the data. 
The model that we estimate is: 
itUSUS
ORUN
ORUNORUNORUN
εFDITech+FDITech
FDIFDITechTech
FAFAWageWageGVAGVA


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)2(*)1(*
)2()1(
21
2176
54321



(3.1) 
 
The interaction term plays a critical role.  It shows how GVAUN changes due to FDI 
inflow in organized sector via technology transmission in addition to a direct effect. 
Therefore the total effect of FDI on unorganized sectors’ value added is an outcome of the 
comparison between the direction and magnitudes of ( ii  , ) in (4). 
UNii
it
it Tech
L
Y
*
        (3.2) 
 
Proposition 2: FDI(-1) and FDI(-2) increases GVAUN , although the positive impact of 
capital spillover falls with passage of time.  
Proof:  The results of the GLS regression are presented in table 3.2. First, a one-unit increase 
in the GVAOR significantly raises the GVAUN at 1% level of significance. This shows that as 
formal firms' valued added increase, the value added of the informal firms increases as well. 
Rise in FAOR reduces GVAUN significantly, i.e., higher the FAOR lower is the volume of jobs 
that the organized firms outsource. Within the unorganized sector, a one-unit rise in FA 
increases GVAUN significantly. But, an increase in real wages in the unorganized sector by 
one-unit reduces the GVAUN significantly, whereas a rise in real WageOR increases GVAUN. 
                                                 
9 The base year of wholesale price index of both the years is the same. 
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This conforms to common perception that rising labor costs leads to production outsourcing. 
An improvement in the technology used in organized sector reduces GVAUN significantly, 
whereas an improvement in the technology of unorganized sector raises its GVA. More 
importantly, both FDI
-1 and FDI-2 increases GVAUN, although the positive impact of capital 
spillover dampens over time.  
The interaction term plays a critical role and provides direction of the transmission 
mechanism by which FDI in organized sector affects GVAUN via outsourcing. The interaction 
terms show that a one-unit increase in FDI raises GVAUN significantly through technology 
transfers.  In other words, as FDI flows into the organized sector, these firms outsource a 
portion of their production to the unorganized sector along with technology inputs. This can 
take the form of more advanced and efficient equipments and production designs as 
anticipated by NCEUS (2009). The rise in GVAUN is a direct outcome of this production 
outsourcing. The FDI-technology link is directly borne out in our empirical result. Moreover, 
the coefficient of the interaction terms, unlike that of FDI, increases over time. This might be 
because it takes time to adapt technology, but once adapted its effect are long term in nature. 
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Table 3.2. Results of GLS Estimation 
Dependent Variable: Unorganized sector gross value added (GVAUN) 
Independent variables Coefficient Std. Error 
GVAOR 0.03* 0.003 
FAUN 0.61* 0.005 
FAOR -0.15* 0.003 
WageUN -0.53* 0.030 
WageOR 0.42* 0.04 
TechUN 16.23* 4.3 
TechOR -3.20* 0.56 
FDI
-1 0.19* 0.03 
FDI
-2 0.17* 0.02 
(TechUN)*FDI-1 1.67* 0.19 
(TechUN)*FDI-2 1.92* 0.12 
Constant -17.14** 10.35 
Note:  * significant at 1%, ** significant at 10%. 
Source: Own calculations. 
 
Additionally, we also show that per worker growth rate of emoluments in 11 out of 14 
unorganized sector industries (except, coke, petroleum products and nuclear fuels, fabricated 
metal products and office, accounting and computing machinery) is either negative or less 
than that in organized sector (Table 3.3). The rise in labor cost, thus, could be a major reason 
for organized to unorganized production outsourcing, although the net effect may not be 
conducive to the merits of demographic dividend.  
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Table 3.3 Growth Rates of Emoluments per Worker in Organized and Unorganized 
Manufacturing between 2000-01 and 2005-06 (%) 
Industry Groups Organized Sector 
Unorganized 
Sector 
Chemicals and chemical products  40 -52 
Coke, petroleum products and nuclear fuel  -8 20 
Food products and beverages  21 -48 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers  19 15 
Machinery and equipments, n.e.c  26 20 
Textiles products  17 -54 
Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.c  5 -25 
Fabricated metal products  18 32 
Rubber and plastic products  27 5 
Paper and paper products  29 -65 
Medical, precision and optical instruments  21 5 
Leather and related products  22 -26 
Office, accounting and computing machinery  25 39 
Wood and wood products  56 -83 
Note: n.e.c = not elsewhere classified, Source: Own calculations. 
 
 
3.3 The Rural Sector and Demographic Dividends in India 
Notwithstanding, the prospects of demographic dividends in India could get even 
weaker unless the large rural sector is rapidly accommodated in the demography-financial 
sector-growth matrix. India, like many other developing and emerging economies still have a 
fair share of the population living in the rural areas with limited and uneven growth 
experiences as compared to the country as a whole.  This implies that while the growing 
urban areas in India benefited significantly from the growth and development impetus 
following the regime shift in economic policies in the country, the rural areas did not catch up 
at the socially desirable level.  The financial deepening and the outreach of development 
outcomes have often been dismal for rural growth trajectories over a significant phase in the 
recent history.  It remains however, that the rural areas have supplied disproportionately more 
  
 
 
37 
population growth for the country and might be the continued source of rural-urban 
migration. This sub-section shows that the financial markets and institutions in major states 
and union territories (federally administered regions) are yet to link the predominantly 
agrarian rural economy to the larger growth and development issues. The consequences of 
this neglect are many.  First, since the financial deepening in the rural areas is fairly low, one 
has to relocate the debate on rural-urban financial links in emerging economies back to the 
rural-urban migration patterns, still.  Note that, the rural population share is as high as 68% of 
the total population of the country.  However, as per data available from the Global 
Development Indicators, World Bank, the population growth rate has mellowed significantly, 
and presently at 0.84% per annum (Figure 3.1).  Clearly, given the immense size of the 
population, any positive growth rate signifies large addition to the existing population in the 
countryside. The question is, would this sizable workforce translate successfully into 
demographic dividends?  
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    Figure 3.1: Rural Population share in Total Population and Annual Growth Rate 
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    Source: World Bank (2012) 
 
The answer as yet seems, no.  Glaring lack of access to bank and non-bank financial 
institutions in the rural and semi-urban areas in India leaves open the scope for spurious and 
mostly illegal financial organizations that mobilize large amounts of savings (in small per 
capita amounts) from these locations and get involved into series of Ponzi schemes. The 
cooperative revolution has not been successful in many parts of the country either, unless it is 
both unique and productive in nature, such as the Gujarat Milk Cooperative Limited. The 
technology transfer between the formal and the informal sector as discussed above could then 
be construed as a possible source by which the productive ensemble of rural workers should 
be made effective in generating considerable economic outputs. The role of the financial 
institutions in facilitating such activities should be remarkable in view of the potential returns 
from investments. Instead, the All India Debt and Investment Survey (AIDIS) by NSSO 
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reveals that the loans taken from moneylenders in the total credit stock of rural households 
have increased from 17.5 percent in 1991 to 29.6 percent in 2002. This indicates an increase 
in indebtedness of rural households over the past decade to informal lending institutions.  
While this may also mean an increased access to credit, AIDIS (1991) suggest that just 16 
percent of rural households had formal loan outstanding.  Based on the World Bank-NCAER 
Rural Financial Access Survey (2003), the corresponding number was 21 percent (Basu, 
2006). 10 On the production side, however, Foster and Rosenzweig (2004) previously argued 
that whenever there has been a productivity increase in the Indian agriculture, the 
consequently higher rural wage has discouraged rural industrialization. Thus, the supply side 
effect could not be compensated by greater demand for local goods through the increased 
income effect.  
 
 
4. Concluding Remarks 
 
Any attempt to relate the demographic change to financial architecture of a country 
remains incomplete without adequate emphasis on the activities in the labor market. In India, 
more than 90% of all labor market activities are confined to the unorganized sector.  We 
developed an econometric exercise in section 3 wherein, we showed that the capital inflow 
into the formal industrial and service sectors spills over to the unorganized sector. The 
relation of this exercise to the demographic transition in India is direct.  We discussed that the 
extant economic growth in India has bypassed the formal industrial sector in favor of large 
contributions from the service sector that does not generate as much employment as the 
industrial sector is capable of creating. At the same time, the formal industries have 
                                                 
10 Chattopadhyay (2011) has shown that during the post-reform period bank credit to 
agriculture has in fact declined which has its negative impact on output. 
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outsourced a significant amount of production to the unorganized sector in order to lower 
organizational costs and remain competitive in the face of steep competition from low cost 
production in East Asia and China.  Overall, the unorganized sector seems to have largely 
accommodated the growing labor force. Notwithstanding, the implications for demographic 
dividend would still be weak because the low capital and technology intensity in the informal 
sector keeps the wages low, savings low and the growth rate low. The break-away from this 
trap is feasible if the large informal labor as well as the rural workforce can be inducted into 
more productive activities with the help of deep financial intermediation.   
This was preceded by a fully laid out VAR model using the dependency ratio, 
financial depth, rate of interest prevailing in the country and capital flow. We showed that 
financial development reduces interest rate, which in turn is expected to raise domestic 
investment. On the other hand, international capital inflow is expected to supplement 
inadequate domestic investment. A reduction in interest rate raises domestic investment, but 
reduces capital inflow. In fact, the recent (2013) currency devaluation in India is a byproduct 
of the large trade deficit coupled with withdrawal of investments from India in view of better 
prospects in the US, where repeal of public support as announced by the government raised 
(compared to India) interest rates for attracting fresh investments.  Further, the estimated 
econometric model established the positive role played by dependency ratio, financial 
development and the interest rate affecting capital inflow. However, the rate of capital inflow 
did not seem very encouraging compared to other emerging market economies, particularly 
China and other East Asian countries, which are already going through the second phase of 
demographic transition.  Overall, our results suggest that in order to make the best out of the 
demographic dividends in India, the government needs to design measures to foster 
entrepreneurship in the formal domain, even if a large number of these turn out to be small 
  
 
 
41 
and medium sized ventures.  It has been suggested in umpteen numbers of previous works 
that the bureaucratic controls and corruptions in India have been detrimental to start-up 
businesses in the formal sector driving a large number of firms in informal activities. Despite 
possible repetition of apparently inane policies (but, using a recent study which shows that 
corruption does not raise informality in those states of India where per capita income is 
higher than a critical level; Dutta, Kar and Roy, 2013), we still suggest that measures to 
restrain corruption and therefore retaining firms in formal businesses may be an important 
step towards raising the level of demographic dividends.  
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